> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.dotvibe.app/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Runtime Hardening

> Default container security policies applied to all Vibe apps.

## Default container security

All containers run with restrictive defaults. No container in v1 runs privileged.

| Policy                        | Setting                                                                                                           |
| ----------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **Dropped capabilities**      | All Linux capabilities dropped by default. Only `NET_BIND_SERVICE` retained if the service binds to ports \< 1024 |
| **Read-only root filesystem** | Enabled where possible. Services that need a writable root get explicit writable overlay mounts                   |
| **No host PID namespace**     | Containers never share the host PID namespace                                                                     |
| **No privileged mode**        | `privileged: true` is rejected — in both native manifests and Compose imports                                     |
| **Limited writable mounts**   | Only explicitly declared volumes and state mounts are writable; all other paths are read-only                     |
| **No host network**           | Containers use project-scoped bridge networking; host network mode is not available                               |
| **No device passthrough**     | No `/dev` device mounts in v1                                                                                     |

## Network isolation

* Each project gets its own CNI network
* Inter-project network traffic is blocked
* Outbound internet access requires the `security.network` capability to be granted by the user
* If network capability is denied, all outbound traffic is blocked (except inter-service traffic within the project)

## Compose imports

The same hardening rules apply to Compose-imported apps. Fields that violate these policies are rejected during import:

| Rejected Compose field | Reason                         |
| ---------------------- | ------------------------------ |
| `privileged: true`     | No privileged containers in v1 |
| `cap_add`              | Capabilities cannot be added   |
| `pid: host`            | No host PID namespace sharing  |
| `network_mode: host`   | No host network mode           |
| `devices`              | No device passthrough          |
| `sysctls`              | No sysctl modification         |
| `security_opt`         | Managed by runtime hardening   |

## VM isolation

All containers run inside a persistent Alpine Linux VM managed via Apple's Virtualization framework. This provides an additional hardware-level isolation boundary between the containers and the macOS host.